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Abstract—We consider a complex Gaussian wiretap channel
with finite-resolution analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) at both
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. For this channel,
we show that a positive secrecy rate is always achievable as
long as the channel gains at the legitimate receiver and at the
eavesdropper are different, regardless of the quantization levels
of the ADCs. For the achievability, we first consider the case of
one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver and apply a binary input
distribution where the two input points have the same phase when
the channel gain at the legitimate receiver is less than that at the
eavesdropper, and otherwise the opposite phase. Then the result
is generalized for the case of arbitrary finite-resolution ADCs
at the legitimate receiver by translating the input distribution
appropriately. For the special case of the real Gaussian wiretap
channel with one-bit ADCs at both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, we show that our choice of input distribution
satisfies a necessary condition of optimal distributions for Wyner
codes.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel, analog-to-digital converter (ADC), finite-resolution ADC,
Wyner code.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel first studied by Wyner [2] is a canonical
model for physical layer security. In a wiretap channel, a
transmitter wants to send its message reliably to a legitimate
receiver while keeping it secret from an eavesdropper. In
this situation, the fundamental limit of the communication
rate, the secrecy capacity, has been characterized first for a
memoryless degraded wiretap channel [2], and for a general
memoryless wiretap channel [3], in the form of optimization
over probability distributions. If the channel is given precisely,
such optimization problem can be solved analytically for
some cases. For the standard Gaussian wiretap channel, the
optimization problem for the secrecy capacity was solved
exactly, and it was shown that the secrecy capacity is zero
when the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the legitimate receiver
is less than the SNR at the eavesdropper [4], [5].
In practice, the digital wireless communication systems
employ analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) at the receivers.
If the resolutions of the ADCs are high enough and the
wireless channel is modeled as the Gaussian channel, then
the digital communication channel can be treated as the ideal
Gaussian channel. But, high resolution ADCs are power-
expensive because the power consumption of an ADC in-
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creases exponentially in the number of its quantization levels
[6]. Recently, various communication strategies when low-
resolution ADCs are employed at the receivers have been
studied to enable low-power communications. For real and
complex point-to-point Gaussian channels with one-bit ADCs,
the binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) and the rotated quadratic
phase-shift keying (QPSK) were shown to achieve the channel
capacity, respectively [7], [8]. However, the optimal input
distribution is not known for the channel with arbitrary ADCs
because it is difficult to solve the optimization problem to
characterize the capacity analytically. For wiretap channels
with quantizers, [9] analyzed an asymptotic achievable down-
link secrecy rate for a MIMO wiretap channel with digital-
to-analog converters (DACs) at the base station. Also, for a
MIMO wiretap channel where an active eavesdropper tries to
spoil the channel estimation at the base station with one-bit
ADCs, the downlink secrecy rate was studied in [10]. The
previous works are reviewed in a greater detail in Section II-B.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no information-
theoretic studies on the classical Gaussian wiretap channel
with finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper.
In this paper, we consider a complex Gaussian wiretap
channel with finite-resolution ADCs at both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, as a model for the low-power
physical layer secure communication. Intuitively, if the chan-
nel gain at the eavesdropper is higher than that at the legitimate
receiver and the quantization at the eavesdropper is finer than
that at the legitimate receiver, one may think that a positive
secrecy rate would not be achievable because the eavesdropper
observes less distorted signals than the legitimate receiver.
Somewhat surprisingly, by exploiting the quantization effect
due to the ADCs, we show that a positive secrecy rate is
always achievable whenever the channel gains of the legitimate
channel and the eavesdropper channel are not equal. This result
holds regardless of the resolutions and the thresholds of the
ADCs. To show the achievability of a positive secrecy rate,
we first focus on the case of symmetric one-bit ADCs at the
legitimate receiver. For such a case, a binary input distribution
is considered where the two input points have the same phase
when the channel gain at the legitimate receiver is less than
that at the eavesdropper, and otherwise the opposite phase. The
resultant achievable secrecy rate is analyzed by approximating
to Z-channels. Then the result is generalized for the case of
arbitrary finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver by
translating the input distribution appropriately.
Furthermore, we partially justify our choice of the input
distributions. Our achievability result implies that the channel
2is not more capable and hence it is not clear whether we can
set the auxiliary random variable as the channel input variable
in the secrecy capacity expression without loss of optimality.
Because it is tricky to handle the auxiliary random variable
in general, we consider the maximally achievable rate by the
Wyner code in [2]. For a real Gaussian wiretap channel with
one-bit ADCs, we show that the optimal input distribution for
the Wyner code should follow the property of our choice of
input distribution, i.e., if the channel gain at the legitimate
channel is less than that at the eavesdropper channel, the
support of the optimal input distribution should be included in
one of the positive or negative regions, and otherwise it should
not.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we for-
mulate our problem, and then review the related works and
summarize our contribution. The achievability of a positive
secrecy rate is proved in Section III and a necessary condition
for the optimal input distributions for the Wyner code is
presented in Section IV. We conclude this paper with some
discussions in Section V.
A. Notations
If the probability mass function (PMF) or the probability
density function (PDF) is well defined for a probability distri-
bution PX , we use the notation PX to denote the correspond-
ing PMF or PDF, and similarly for the conditional distribution
PY |X=x. The support of a distribution PX is denoted as
S(PX). If X follows a distribution P , EX∼P denotes the
expectation with respect to X , and the subscript is omitted
if it is obvious from the context. We denote E[X · 1{X∈A}]
by E[X ;X ∈ A], where 1 denotes the indicator function. For
given probability distribution PX of a real random variable X ,
P|X| denotes the probability distribution of |X |. For random
variables X,Y, and Z , X − Y − Z denotes a Markov chain,
i.e., X and Z are conditionally independent given Y . The
binary entropy function is denoted as h(·), and fN (x;µ, σ2) is
the PDF of the Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2. The function Q(·) is the tail distribution function of the
standard normal distribution,
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
fN (u; 0, 1)du.
The sign function, sgn(·), refers
sgn(x) =
{
1, x ≥ 0
−1, x < 0 ,
and [x]+ = max{x, 0}. For x ∈ C, R(x) (resp. I(x)) denotes
the real (resp. imaginary) part of x and j denotes
√−1. The
sets {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0} and {x ∈ R : x ≤ 0} are denoted as R+
and R−, respectively. For integers a and b, [a : b] denotes the
set {a, a+ 1, · · · , b− 1, b}.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In Section III, the positivity of secrecy capacity is shown
first for the case with one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver.
Then, the results are generalized to the case with arbitrary
finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver through some
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Fig. 1: A Gaussian wiretap channel with one-bit ADCs at the
legitimate receiver and finite-resolution ADCs at the eaves-
dropper.
simple manipulation. Hence, for simplicity, we formulate the
problem for the channel with one-bit ADCs at the legitimate
receiver.
A. Model
Consider a memoryless complex Gaussian wiretap channel
with one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver and finite-
resolution ADCs at the eavesdropper. The quantization is
assumed to be applied separately for real and imaginary parts.
For the eavesdropper, we assume kR ≥ 2 and kI ≥ 2 quanti-
zation points for the real and imaginary parts, respectively.
The quantization function of the ki-point ADC Qki(·) for
i ∈ {R, I} is given as
Qki(x) = yi,l if x ∈ [qi,l−1, qi,l), (1)
for all l ∈ [1 : ki], where (qi,1, · · · , qi,ki−1) ∈ Rki−1 are
the threshold points, (yi,1, · · · , yi,ki) ∈ Rki are the output
points, and qi,0 = −∞, qi,ki =∞. The threshold points are
assumed to be qi,l−1 < qi,l for all l ∈ [1 : ki], and output
points are distinct. For the ADCs at the legitimate receiver,
we consider one-bit ADCs, and an one-bit ADC corresponds
to the quantization function with only one threshold point 0,
and the output points (−1, 1).
The transmitter sends a channel inputX , then the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper observe Y1 and Y2, respectively,
which follows the input-output relationship given as
Y1 = sgn(R(w1X + N1)) + j · sgn(I(w1X + N1)), (2)
Y2 = QkR(R(w2X +N2)) + j · QkI(I(w2X +N2)), (3)
as depicted in Fig. 1. The complex channel gains w1, w2 are
assumed to be non-zero constants, and known at both the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver. The Gaussian noises
Ni ∼ CN (0, 2) are independent with each other and with X .
Thus, the channel transition probabilities are given as
PY1|X(1± j|x) = Q (−R(w1x)) ·Q (∓I(w1x)) , (4)
PY1|X(−1∓ j|x) = Q (R(w1x)) ·Q (±I(w1x)) , (5)
PY2|X(yR,i + j · yI,l|x)
= (Q (qR,i−1 −R(w2x)) −Q (qR,i −R(w2x))) (6)
· (Q (qI,l−1 − I(w2x)) −Q (qI,l − I(w2x))) ,
3for i ∈ [1 : kR], and l ∈ [1 : kI].
Through n ∈ N channel uses, the transmitter encodes a
uniformly distributed message M ∈ M = [1 : 2⌈nR⌉] into
the channel input Xn = fn(M) with some encoding function
fn :M→ Cn satisfying the average power constraint J > 0,
i.e.,
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Xi|2
]
≤ J. (7)
The legitimate receiver decodes Mˆ = gn(Y
n
1 ) based on the
observation Y n1 using a decoding function gn : C
n →M. As
in [2], a secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if there exists
a sequence of {(fn, gn)}n∈N satisfying
lim
n→∞
P{Mˆ 6=M} = 0, lim
n→∞
1
n
I(M ;Y n2 ) = 0. (8)
The secrecy capacity Cs is defined as the supremum of
achievable secrecy rates.
B. Previous Work and Our Contribution
In the following, we review some of previous works on
1) wiretap channels (without ADCs) and 2) (non-wiretap)
channels with ADCs. Then the main contribution of this paper
is summarized.
1) Wiretap Channel: The wiretap channel was first studied
by Wyner in [2], where the secrecy capacity of a degraded
wiretap channel was characterized as
CDs = sup
PX
I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Y2). (9)
For a general wiretap channel with the average power con-
straint J , [3] showed that the secrecy capacity is given as
Cs = sup
PU,X :
U−X−(Y1,Y2)
E[X2]≤J
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Y2). (10)
We note that it is sufficient to set U = X in (10) for a class
of more capable channels where I(X ;Y1) ≥ I(X ;Y2) for all
PX , which includes the degraded channels [3].
If the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel are
Gaussian [4], [5] with average power constraint J , the secrecy
capacity is simplified to
CGs =
[
log
(
1 +
|w1|2J
2
)
− log
(
1 +
|w2|2J
2
)]+
, (11)
which is achieved by letting U = X and X ∼ CN (0, J) in
(10). This follows from the fact that the Gaussian wiretap
channel is degraded. Hence, a positive secrecy rate of the
Gaussian wiretap channel without ADCs is not achievable
when |w1| ≤ |w2|, which makes sense because the eaves-
dropper observes a signal with a better quality.
2) Channels with ADCs: For a real Gaussian channel with
average power constraint J where the receiver employs a one-
bit ADC, [7] showed that the BPSK with power J achieves
the capacity of
CR,1-bit = 1− h
(
Q
(
|w|
√
J
))
. (12)
Moreover, [7] showed that the capacity for the channel with
a k-point ADC at the receiver can be achieved by a discrete
distribution with at most k + 1 points of support, by apply-
ing Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. For a complex
Gaussian channel with component-wise one-bit ADCs at the
receiver, [8] showed that the capacity is given as
CC,1-bit = 2
(
1− h
(
Q
(
|w|
√
J
2
)))
, (13)
and the QPSK with the phase rotation −∠w and power
J achieves the capacity.1 For the aforementioned real and
complex channels with one-bit ADCs, the optimal input distri-
bution was analyzed by exploiting the concavity of the mutual
information I(X ;Y ) in PX , the symmetry of the channel, and
the convexity of h(Q(
√·)) [11].
3) Our Contribution: First, we show that a positive secrecy
rate is achievable whenever |w1| 6= |w2|, no matter what the
thresholds of ADCs are. To show the achievability, we focus
on the Wyner code [2] which achieves I(X ;Y1) − I(X ;Y2)
for input distribution PX . One might expect that if the one-bit
ADCs are at the legitimate receiver, |w1| > |w2|, and PX is set
to the rotated QPSK, which maximizes I(X ;Y1), then it would
be easily shown that a positive secrecy rate is achievable.
However, it is tricky to handle I(X ;Y2) exactly or find a tight
upper bound on it as the number of possible realizations of Y2
is kR · kI. Thus, it is not clear whether such QPSK achieves
a positive secrecy rate in general (if one-bit ADCs are also
employed at the eavesdropper, it can be proved that a positive
secrecy rate is achievable, which is proved in Appendix A).
As a way to avoid this difficulty, we consider a binary input
distribution and analyze the resultant rate by approximating
each of the legitimate and the eavesdropper channels to a Z-
channel.
Second, for a real Gaussian channel with one-bit ADCs,
we find a necessary condition for the optimal distributions for
Wyner code. In contrast to a Gaussian wiretap channel without
ADCs, the sufficiency of U = X in (10) is not straightforward
because our channel is shown to be not capable. Because it is
tricky to handle the auxiliary random variable U in general, we
consider the maximally achievable secrecy rate by the Wyner
code given in (9), which is also used for showing the positivity
of the secrecy capacity. The Wyner code (9) is of practical
interest, because there is a polar code for wiretap channels
[12] which achieves the secrecy rate of I(X ;Y1) − I(X ;Y2)
when PX is set to a binary uniform distribution.
2 Also, a
study in [13] shows that the characterization of (9) can be
used to find the secrecy capacity (10) (a detailed discussion is
in Section V).
Even if U = X , the optimal distributions cannot be found
directly by the previous techniques. For our Gaussian wiretap
channel with ADCs, I(X ;Y1) − I(X ;Y2) is not concave in
PX . Therefore, we cannot use the previous techniques [7]
directly for finding the optimal distributions for (9). Moreover,
because the difference between two mutual information terms
1In this paper,
√
J/2 is in (13) instead of
√
J , because we set the variance
of complex Gaussian noise to 2.
2The channel was restricted to a symmetric channel in [12], but it can be
checked that the secrecy rate of I(X; Y1)− I(X; Y2) is also achievable for
any binary-input memoryless discrete wiretap channel.
4is optimized in (9), the technique used for proving the suffi-
ciency of finite support in [7], which relies on some monotonic
property related to a single mutual information term, cannot
be applied directly.
III. ACHIEVABILITY OF A POSITIVE SECRECY RATE
In this section, we show that a positive secrecy rate is
achievable regardless of the quantization levels of the ADCs
as long as |w1| 6= |w2|.
In the following, we focus on the achievability of a positive
secrecy rate without a power constraint. If a positive secrecy
rate is achievable by using possibly very large (but finite)
power, this implies that it is also achievable in the presence of
the power constraint since the transmit power can be adjusted
to satisfy the power constraint by time-burst transmission, i.e.,
use the scheme for 0 < α ≤ J/E[|X |2] fraction of time and
stay idle for the remaining time.
For a channel without power constraint, the Wyner code [2]
with input distribution PX achieves the secrecy rate Rs(PX)
given as
Rs(PX) := I(PX , PY1|X)− I(PX , PY2|X)
= I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Y2). (14)
The following theorem states that Rs(PX) > 0 for some
PX for the case with one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver.
Theorem 3.1: For a Gaussian wiretap channel with one-bit
ADCs at the legitimate receiver and finite-resolution ADCs at
the eavesdropper, there exists PX such that Rs(PX) > 0 and
E[|X |2] <∞ whenever |w1| 6= |w2|.
This theorem is generalized to the channel with arbi-
trary finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver in
Corollary 3.3.
Before a precise and rigorous proof, let us first present
the main ideas and intuitions used in the proof. In general,
it is tricky to handle the mutual information I(X ;Y2) exactly,
because it involves a number of terms as the number of
possible realizations of Y2 is kR · kI. To avoid this difficulty,
we choose PX as a binary distribution whose support contains
a point with very large absolute value. For such PX , each of
the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel can be
approximated to Z-channels. Since the mutual information for
a Z-channel is decreasing in the crossover probability, it is
sufficient to compare only the crossover probabilities of each
equivalent Z-channels to show Rs(PX) > 0.
To illustrate this intuition, assume that the channel is a real
(instead of complex) channel where the one-bit ADC is at the
legitimate receiver and the k-point ADC is at the eavesdropper.
Suppose w1, w2 > 0, and let PX be a binary distribution given
as
PX(x) =
{
φ if x = a
1− φ if x = b , (15)
where 0 < φ < 1, and b is sufficiently large. Then, both
PY1|X(1|b) and PY2|X(yk|b) are close to 1, because the
Gaussian noises can be ignored for large b. Equivalently,
X
a
b
Y1
−1
1
1
PY1|X(1|a)
X
a
b yk
1
PY2|X(yk|a)
Y2
else
Fig. 2: The Z-channels equivalent to the original channels
when b→∞.
PY1|X(−1|b) and PY2|X(yl|b) are close to 0 for all l < k.
Therefore, the conditional entropies are approximated to
H(X |Y1) ≈ PY1(1) ·H(X |Y1 = 1), (16)
H(X |Y2) ≈ PY2(yk) ·H(X |Y2 = yk). (17)
The RHS of (16) and (17) are equal to the corresponding
conditional entropies of Z-channels depicted in Fig. 2. Hence,
the original channels can be regarded as the Z-channels
because the mutual informations are preserved. Therefore,
if there exists a which satisfies PY1|X(1|a) < PY2|X(yk|a),
then Rs(PX) > 0 can be achieved by choosing such a in
(15). The existence of such a can be checked graphically in
Fig. 3. Consider first the case of w1 > w2. In Fig. 3-(a),
the blue dashed area and the red solid area correspond to
PY1|X(1|a) and PY2|X(yk|a), respectively. We can show that
there exists a < 0 such that a larger variance of 1/w22
overcome the effect of constant gap qk−1/w2 of thresholds
so that PY2|X(yk|a) > PY1|X(1|a). For the case w1 < w2,
in Fig. 3-(b), the blue dashed area and the red solid area
correspond to 1 − PY1|X(1|a) and 1 − PY2|X(yk|a), respec-
tively. Due to the similar reason, we can show that there exists
a > 0 such that 1 − PY1|X(1|a) > 1 − PY2|X(yk|a), i.e.,
PY2|X(yk|a) > PY1|X(1|a).
The intuition from a real channel can be generalized into
a complex channel, but the phases of w1 and w2 should be
considered when converting to equivalent Z-channels. Let PX
be a binary distribution with phase Φ, i.e.,
PX(x) =
{
φ if x = aejΦ
1− φ if x = bejΦ , (18)
where 0 < φ < 1, a, b ∈ R, and b is sufficiently large. If
∠(wiX) = Φ + ∠wi is a multiple of pi/2 for some i = 1, 2,
then Yi given X = be
jΦ does not converge to one point as
b increases, because R(wib) or I(wib) becomes 0 in (4)-(6).
Therefore, to apply the Z-channel intuition illustrated for the
real channel, Φ + ∠wi should not be a multiple of pi/2 for
i = 1, 2.
Now, even if Φ + ∠wi is not a multiple of pi/2 so that Yi
converges to one point as b increases for i = 1, 2, comparing
the crossover probabilities of equivalent Z-channels is not
simple. Let θ := ∠(w2X) = Φ+∠w2, and ∆ := ∠w1 − ∠w2,
so that θ + ∆ = ∠(w1X). To analyze the equivalent Z-
channels, we need to specify the quantized points y¯i such that
PYi|X(y¯i|bejΦ) ≈ 1 for sufficiently large b. Because y¯1 and
5(a) w1 > w2 > 0
(b) w2 > w1 > 0
Fig. 3: For given any given (w1, w2, qk−1), w1 6= w2, there
exists a which satisfies PY1|X(1|a) < PY2|X(yk|a) because
the tail of the PDF of a Gaussian distribution is steeper as its
variance increases.
y¯2 depend on θ+∆ and θ, respectively, the crossover proba-
bilities pi = PYi|X(y¯i|aejΦ) also depend on such phases. For
example, assume θ (or Φ, equivalently) is set to θ ∈ (0, pi/2).
Then, we have y¯2 = yR,kR + j · yI,kI , and
p2 = Q (qR,kR−1 − |w2|a cos θ)
·Q (qI,kI−1 − |w2|a sin θ) . (19)
However, as y¯1 depends on ∆, the proof should be done
considering four possible cases, i.e., y¯1 ∈ {1 ± j,−1 ± j}.
Moreover, for each case of y¯1 ∈ {1 ± j,−1 ± j}, some
complicated calculation is required to find a satisfying p1 < p2
through the triangle inequalities related to both θ and ∆.
To simplify the analysis, we choose θ (or Φ, equivalently)
to satisfy
θ +∆ = mpi/2− θ if (m− 1)pi/2 ≤ ∆ < mpi/2, (20)
θ
θ
θ
∆
Re
Im
w1 · ae
j(Φ−∆)w1 · ae
jΦ
Fig. 4: The relation between θ and ∆ for m = 2 in (20). By
the symmetry, (21) holds.
for m ∈ Z. Then, p2 is given as (19) because 0 < θ ≤ pi/4,
and p1 can be shown to be given as follows for all ∆:
p1 = PY1|X
(
1 + j
∣∣∣aej(Φ−∆))
= PY1|X
(
1 + j
∣∣∣aej(θ−∠w1)) . (21)
The above equation implies that we can treat y¯1 as 1 + j by
regarding the input as aej(θ−∠w1), and do not need to prove
the theorem separately for all y¯1 ∈ {1± j,−1± j}. This can
be understood graphically, as in Fig. 4. In this figure, the real
and imaginary axes correspond to the threshold lines of the
one-bit ADCs at the legitimate receiver, and θ+∆ ∈ (pi/2, pi).
Therefore, y¯1 = −1 + j. The crossover probability p1 is the
probability that Y1 = −1 + j when the black circle plus N1
is the input of the quantization. Because N1 is the circular
symmetric Gaussian noise, p1 is equal to the probability that
Y1 = 1 + j when the red square plus N1 is the input of the
quantization. Similar interpretation is available for all m ∈ Z.
Now, because θ is the only phase to consider to analyze p1
and p2 in (19) and (21), respectively, the condition for a to
satisfy p1 < p2 can be found easily.
A precise proof for Theorem 3.1 is given in the following.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let us first prove the theorem for
the real channel with one-bit ADC at the legitimate receiver
and k-point ADC at the eavesdropper, and then generalize it
for the complex channel.
1) Real channel
The input-output relationships for a real channel are given
as
Y1 = sgn(w1X +N1), (22)
Y2 = Qk(w2X +N2), (23)
where Ni ∼ N (0, 1). Let PX be a binary distribution given
as
PX(sgn(w2) · a) = φ, PX(sgn(w2) · b) = 1− φ, (24)
for some a, b ∈ R, and φ ∈ (0, 1).
Let us first derive the limit values of the mutual information
terms when b tends to infinity:
lim
b→∞
I(X ;Y2) = H(X)− lim
b→∞
H(X |Y2) (25)
= h(φ)− lim
b→∞
PY2(yk) ·H(X |Y2 = yk) (26)
= h(φ)− (1− φ+ φp2) · h
(
1− φ
1− φ+ φp2
)
(27)
= h(φ(1 − p2))− φh(p2), (28)
6where
p2 = PY2|X(yk|sgn(w2) · a) = Q(qk−1 − |w2|a). (29)
Here, (26) follows from the continuity of PY2|X(·|sgn(w2)b)
in b, lim
b→∞
PX|Y2(sgn(w2)b|yl) = 0 when l < k, and (28) is
from the following equations:
H(φp, 1− φ, φ− φp) = h(φ) + φh(p)
= h(φ(1− p)) + (1− φ+ φp)h
(
1− φ
1− φ+ φp
)
. (30)
Similarly, we can derive
lim
b→∞
I(X ;Y1) = h (φ(1 − p1))− φh (p1) , (31)
where
p1 = PY1|X(sgn(w1w2)|sgn(w2) · a) = Q(−|w1|a). (32)
Then, we get
lim
b→∞
Rs(PX) = fφ(p1)− fφ(p2), (33)
where fφ(p) := h(φ(1 − p))− φh(p).
The function fφ(p) corresponds to the mutual information
between input and output of the Z-channel with crossover
probability p when the input follows Bern(φ). Thus, it de-
creases in p.
Lemma 3.2: For 0 < φ < 1, fφ(p) is decreasing on
p ∈ (0, 1).
The above lemma can be proved easily by checking the
derivative of fφ(p). Then, (29), (32), (33), Lemma 3.2, and
the monotonicity of Q(x) implies that lim
b→∞
Rs(PX) > 0 if
(|w2| − |w1|)a > qk−1. (34)
Because |w1| 6= |w2|, there exists a satisfying (34). Now, due
to the continuity of Rs(PX) in b, we conclude that there exist
φ, a, and b <∞ such that Rs(PX) > 0.
2) Complex channel
Let PX be a binary distribution
PX(ae
jΦ) = φ, PX(be
jΦ) = 1− φ, (35)
0 < φ < 1, and a, b,Φ ∈ R. For a simple parameterization,
let θ := Φ + ∠w2, and ∆ := ∠w1−∠w2. Then, the transition
probabilities (4)-(6) can be represented as
PY1|X(1± j|xejΦ) = Q(−|w1|x cos(θ +∆))
·Q(∓|w1|x sin(θ +∆)), (36)
PY1|X(−1± j|xejΦ) = Q(|w1|x cos(θ +∆))
·Q(∓|w1|x sin(θ +∆)), (37)
PY2|X(yR,i + j · yI,l|xejΦ)
= (Q (qR,i−1 − |w2|x cos θ)−Q (qR,i − |w2|x cos θ))
· (Q (qI,l−1 − |w2|x sin θ)−Q (qI,l − |w2|x sin θ)) , (38)
where x ∈ {a, b}.
For given ∆, choose θ (or Φ, equivalently) such that (20)
is satisfied. Similar to the real case, let us evaluate the limit
values of the mutual information terms as b tends to infinity.
Because 0 < θ ≤ pi/4 under the condition (20), we have
lim
b→∞
PX|Y2(be
jΦ|yR,i + j · yI,l) = 0, (39)
for i 6= kR or l 6= kI. Thus, the limit value of I(X ;Y2) is
given as
lim
b→∞
I(X ;Y2) = fφ(p2), (40)
where
p2 = Q (qR,kR−1 − |w2|a cos θ)
·Q (qI,kI−1 − |w2|a sin θ) . (41)
For the limit value of I(X ;Y1), let y¯1 be the point such that
lim
b→∞
PY1|X(y¯1|bejΦ) = 1. (42)
Because mpi/2− pi/4 ≤ θ +∆ < mpi/2,
y¯1 =
√
2
(
cos
(mpi
2
− pi
4
)
+ j · sin
(mpi
2
− pi
4
))
. (43)
Then, we have
lim
b→∞
I(X ;Y1) = fφ(p1), (44)
where p1 is given as
p1 = PY1|X(y¯1|aejΦ) (45)
= Q
(
−√2|w1|a cos
(mpi
2
− pi
4
)
cos
(mpi
2
− θ
))
(46)
·Q
(
−
√
2|w1|a sin
(mpi
2
− pi
4
)
sin
(mpi
2
− θ
))
= Q (−|w1|a (t cos θ + (1− t) sin θ)) (47)
·Q (−|w1|a ((1 − t) cos θ + t sin θ))
= Q(−|w1|a cos θ)Q(−|w1|a sin θ), (48)
where t = cos(mpi/2)
2
, and the last equality follows from
t ∈ {0, 1}.
By Lemma 3.2, lim
b→∞
Rs(PX) = fφ(p1) − fφ(p2) > 0
if p1 < p2. From (41), (48), and the monotonicity of Q(·),
p1 < p2 holds if{
qR,kR−1 − |w2|a cos θ < −|w1|a cos θ
qI,kI−1 − |w2|a sin θ < −|w1|a sin θ
, (49)
or equivalently,{
qR,kR−1 < (|w2| − |w1|)a cos θ
qI,kI−1 < (|w2| − |w1|)a sin θ
. (50)
Because cos θ, sin θ > 0, and |w2| − |w1| 6= 0, there exists a
which satisfies the above inequalities. Now, by the continuity
of Rs(PX) in b, we conclude that there exist φ, a and b <∞
such that Rs(PX) > 0.
Theorem 3.1 is generalized for a channel with arbitrary
finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate receiver as follows.
Corollary 3.3: For a Gaussian wiretap channel with finite-
resolution ADCs at both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, there exists PX such that Rs(PX) > 0 and
E[|X |2] <∞ whenever |w1| 6= |w2|.
7Proof: Let us first assume arbitrary 2-point ADCs at
the legitimate receiver with threshold points cR and cI
for the real and imaginary parts, respectively, and finite-
resolution ADCs at the eavesdropper with threshold points
qR = (qR,1, · · · , qR,kR−1) and qI = (qI,1, · · · , qR,kI−1) for
the real and imaginary parts, respectively. Now, let
X˜ = X + cR/w1 + j · cI/w1. Note that X˜ is a translated
version of X . Hence it can be shown that if PX achieves
a positive secrecy rate Rs > 0 when the symmetric one-
bit ADCs are at the legitimate receiver and finite-resolution
ADCs with the threshold points qR − R
(
w2
w1
(cR + j · cI)
)
and qI − I
(
w2
w1
(cR + j · cI)
)
are at the eavesdropper, then
PX˜ achieves the same secrecy rate Rs for the initially as-
sumed channel. Therefore, we can conclude that a positive
secrecy rate is achievable when arbitrary 2-point ADCs are at
the legitimate receiver and finite-resolution ADCs are at the
eavesdropper.
Now, suppose finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate re-
ceiver with threshold points cR and cI, which contain cR
and cI, respectively. Then, by the data processing inequality,
a positive secrecy rate is also achievable. Because arbitrary
cR, cI, qR, and qI are assumed, we conclude that a positive
secrecy rate is achievable as long as |w1| 6= |w2| for arbitrary
finite-resolution ADCs at both the legitimate receiver and at
the eavesdropper.
Remark 1: For |w2| ≈ 0, intuitively the achievability
scheme used in the proof with almost all pairs of (a, b)
will achieve a positive secrecy rate, but (50) says that it
is guaranteed only for a less than some constant even if
|w2| = 0. This seemingly counter-intuitive result is because
lim
b→∞
lim
|w2|→0
Rs(PX) 6= lim
|w2|→0
lim
b→∞
Rs(PX) in general. Tak-
ing the limit |w2| → 0 first means ignoring the eavesdropper
channel first. In this case, lim
|w2|→0
Rs(PX) = I(X ;Y1), so
every pair of (a, b) achieves a positive secrecy rate. On the
other hand, taking the limit b → ∞ first means applying the
Z-channel intuition first. In this case, as long as |w2| > 0,
lim
b→∞
Rs(PX) > 0 is not guaranteed for some a.
IV. ON THE OPTIMAL DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THE WYNER
CODE
In Section III, it is shown that a binary distribution PX
such that two input points have the same phase if |w1| < |w2|
and otherwise the opposite phase achieves a positive secrecy
rate, when the one-bit ADCs are at the legitimate receiver.
The following theorem states that for a real Gaussian wiretap
channel with one-bit ADCs at both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, this choice of the phase is a necessary
condition for the optimal distributions P ∗X for the Wyner code,
i.e.,
Rs(P
∗
X) = sup
PX :E[X2]≤J
Rs(PX). (51)
Theorem 4.1: For a real Gaussian wiretap channel with one-
bit ADCs, if |w1| < |w2|,
S(P ∗X) ⊂ R+ or S(P ∗X) ⊂ R−. (52)
If |w1| > |w2|,
S(P ∗X) 6⊂ R+ \ {0} and S(P ∗X) 6⊂ R− \ {0}. (53)
The following lemma plays a key role to prove the above
theorem.
Lemma 4.2: For a real Gaussian wiretap channel with one-
bit ADCs at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
if |w1| < |w2|,
Rs
(
P|X|
) ≥ Rs(PX), (54)
and if |w1| > |w2|,
Rs
(
P|X|
) ≤ Rs(PX), (55)
for all PX which satisfies E[X
2] <∞. If X is not a constant,
then each equality holds if and only if S(PX ) ⊂ R+ or
S(PX) ⊂ R−.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: First note that the sign of wi does
not affect the mutual information terms as follows:
I(X ;Yi) = h(E[Q(wiX)])− E[h(Q(wiX))] (56)
= h(1− E[Q(−wiX)])− E[h(1−Q(−wiX))] (57)
= h(E[Q(−wiX)])− E[h(Q(−wiX))]. (58)
Therefore, we assume w1, w2 > 0 without loss of generality.
To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to consider the sign of
Rs(P|X|)−Rs(PX). Both the distributions, PX and P|X|,
induce the same conditional entropies because
H(Yi|X) = E[h(Q(wiX))] (59)
= E[h(Q(wiX));X > 0] + E[h(Q(wiX));X ≤ 0] (60)
= E[h(Q(wiX));X > 0] + E[h(Q(−wiX));X ≤ 0] (61)
= E[h(Q(wi|X |))] (62)
= EX∼P|X| [h(Q(wiX)]. (63)
Therefore, the difference becomes
Rs(P|X|)−Rs(PX)
= h(E[Q(w1|X |)])− h(E[Q(w1X)]) (64)
− {h(E[Q(w2|X |)])− h(E[Q(w2X)])}
= F (w1)− F (w2), (65)
where F (w) := h(E[Q(w|X |)])− h(E[Q(wX)]).
Let us define c(w) and d(w) as
c(w) =
1
2
(E[Q(w|X |)] + E[Q(wX)]) (66)
= E[Q(wX);X > 0] +
1
2
E[Q(−wX);X ≤ 0] (67)
+
1
2
E[Q(wX);X ≤ 0]
= E[Q(wX);X > 0] +
1
2
PX(R−), (68)
and
d(w) =
1
2
(E[Q(wX)]− E[Q(w|X |)]) (69)
=
1
2
(E[Q(wX);X ≤ 0]− E[Q(−wX);X ≤ 0]) (70)
= E[Q(wX);X ≤ 0]− 1
2
PX(R−). (71)
8Then, the function F (·) can be represented as
F (w) = h(c(w) − d(w)) − h(c(w) + d(w)). (72)
By the monotonicity of Q(·), it can be checked
that c(w) is non-increasing, d(w) is non-decreasing, and
0 ≤ d(w) < c(w) ≤ 1/2 for w > 0. The strictly inequality
d(w) < c(w) follows from E[X2] < ∞. Furthermore, the
following lemma can be proved easily by deriving the partial
derivatives.
Lemma 4.3: For 0 < d < c < 1/2, h(c− d) − h(c+ d) is
strictly increasing in c for fixed d, and strictly decreasing in
d for fixed c.
Hence, from the above lemma and the monotonicity of c(w)
and d(w), it follows that F (w) is decreasing in w, which
proves (54) and (55).
Now let us check the equality conditions in (54) and (55).
Suppose X is not a constant. Then, at least one of c(w) and
d(w) is strictly monotonic in w > 0. Hence, F (w) remains
constant if and only if c(w) = 1/2 or d(w) = 0 for all w > 0.
The equality conditions follow from the fact that c(w) = 1/2
if and only if S(PX) ⊂ R−, and d(w) = 0 if and only if
S(PX) ⊂ R+.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Because sup
PX :E[X2]≤J
Rs(PX) > 0
by Theorem 3.1, X is not a constant. Since P ∗X is the
optimal distribution, the inequality (54) should be equality
when |w1| < |w2| for P ∗X . Therefore, (52) follows from the
equality condition in Lemma 4.2.
For |w1| > |w2|, suppose S(P ∗X) ⊂ R+ \ {0}. Choose
x ∈ S(P ∗X) which is not the maximum, and define P ′X as
P ′X(A) = P
∗
X(−(A ∩ [−x, 0))) + P ∗X(A ∩ (x,∞)), (73)
for every Borel set A ⊂ R. Then, P ′|X| = P ∗X , and S(P ′X)
is not the subset of R+ or R−. By the equality condition in
Lemma 4.2, Rs(P
∗
X) < Rs(P
′
X), which contradicts to the
optimality of P ∗X . Therefore, S(P ∗X) 6⊂ R+ \ {0}. Similarly,
it can be shown that S(P ∗X ) 6⊂ R− \ {0}.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we showed that a positive secrecy rate is
always achievable for a Gaussian wiretap channel with ADCs,
as long as the channel gains are not the same. For the achiev-
ability, we first showed the achievability for the case when
the one-bit ADCs are at the legitimate receiver. For such a
case, we employed binary channel inputs with the same phase
or opposite phase depending on the channel conditions, and
analyzed the achievable rate by approximating the resultant
channels to Z-channels. Then the result was generalized for the
channel with arbitrary finite-resolution ADCs at the legitimate
receiver through some simple manipulation. Moreover, for a
real Gaussian wiretap channel with one-bit ADCs, such phase
condition used for the achievability was shown to satisfy a
necessary condition for the optimal input distribution for the
Wyner code.
The Wyner code we considered in this paper can be applied
to practical digital communication systems. As we mentioned
in Section II-B, the polar code in [12] for wiretap channel
achieves Rs(PX) for binary uniform input distribution PX . As
our achievability holds for uniform distribution, i.e., φ = 1/2
in (24), the code in [12] with the modulation which we
used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 can be used for a secure
communication system in practice.
A potential future work of interest would be to characterize
the exact secrecy capacity and the optimal distributions which
achieve it. In Section II-B, we mentioned that the solution of
(9) would be helpful for analyzing the secrecy capacity. Our
expectation comes from the fact that
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Y2) = I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Y2)
+ [I(X ;Y2|U)− I(X ;Y1|U)] , (74)
for U − X − (Y1, Y2), as in [13]. Now, let P ∗X denote a
distribution achieving (9) and {P˜ iX : i = 1, 2, · · · } denote
the set of distributions achieving sup
PX
I(X ;Y2)− I(X ;Y1). If
P ∗X can be represented as a weighted sum of P˜
i
X ’s, i.e., there
exists {θi} such that θi ≥ 0,
∑
i
θi = 1 and
P ∗X =
∑
i
θiP˜
i
X , (75)
the secrecy capacity is given by
Cs = max
PX
[I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Y2)]
+ max
PX
[I(X ;Y2)− I(X ;Y1)]. (76)
Therefore, the characterization of the optimal distributions
which achieve (9) can be used to find the secrecy capacity.
In this work, we provided a necessary condition for the
optimal distributions which achieve (9). One possible way
to find more necessary conditions is to apply Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions. There have been some studies
on necessary conditions for the optimal support using KKT
conditions [7], [14], [15] for point-to-point channels, where
the cardinality of the optimal support is bounded. The KKT
conditions that used for point-to-point channels [15, Theorem
10] can be modified for wiretap channels. Precisely, if P ∗X is
that of (51), there exists λ ≥ 0 such that following conditions
are satisfied:
λ(EX∼P∗
X
[X2]− J) = 0, (77)
i(x;P ∗X , PY1|X)− i(x;P ∗X , PY2|X)− λ(x2 − EX∼P∗X [X2])
≤ Rs(P ∗X), (78)
for all x ∈ R, and equality holds if x ∈ S(P ∗X).3 We expect
that it would be possible to find a stronger condition by
combining KKT conditions and Theorem 4.1 in our work.
APPENDIX A
For a complex Gaussian wiretap channel with one bit ADCs
at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, let us
show that the QPSK aligned to the legitimate channel achieves
a positive secrecy rate whenever |w1| > |w2|.
3In our channel, only necessity is guaranteed because Rs(PX ) is not
concave in PX .
9In this channel, the transition probabilities are given by
PYi|X(1± j|x) = Q(−R(wix))Q(∓I(wix)), (79)
PYi|X(−1± j|x) = Q(R(wix))Q(∓I(wix)), (80)
for i = 1, 2. Let PX(x) = 1/4 for x ∈ QPSKJ · e−j∠w1 ,
where
QPSKJ :=
√
J
2
· {1± j,−1± j}. (81)
Then, it can be shown that H(Yi) = 2 for i = 1, 2 from
PYi|X(yi|x) = PYi|X(yi · ej·pi/2|x · ej·pi/2), (82)
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, x ∈ C, and yi ∈ {1± j,−1± j}. Then, the
mutual informations are given as
I(X ;Y1) = 2
(
1− h
(
Q
(
|w1|
√
J
2
)))
, (83)
I(X ;Y2) = 2−H(Y2|X) (84)
= 2− h
(
Q
(
|w2|
√
J cos(∆)
))
(85)
− h
(
Q
(
|w2|
√
J sin(∆)
))
,
where ∆ = ∠w1 −∠w2. Because h
(
Q
(√·)) is convex [11],
we have
I(X ;Y2) ≤ 2
(
1− h
(
Q
(
|w2|
√
J
2
)))
. (86)
Therefore, from (83) and (86),
Rs(PX)
≥ 2
(
h
(
Q
(
|w2|
√
J
2
))
− h
(
Q
(
|w1|
√
J
2
)))
> 0, (87)
if |w1| > |w2|.
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